


IN VIEW OF CURRENT TRENDS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS:  
SHOULD THE UNITED NATIONS CONTINUE EMPLOYING  
UNARMED OBSERVERS?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

IN VIEW OF CURRENT TRENDS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: SHOULD THE UNITED NATIONS CONTINUE EMPLOYING UNARMED OBSERVERS? by Major Miraji K Suleiman, Kenya Army, 69 pages.

The United Nations, in pursuit of conflict resolution, established numerous peacekeeping missions in the world. Some of these missions date back to as early as when the UN itself came into being. Military observers, as part of the effort, have been employed unarmed despite the different situations in which they have operated, some of which might have required a different approach.

This study analyses three case studies: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) set up in 1948 in the Middle East, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) established in 1992 in the Balkans, and United Nations Organization Mission in Congo (MONUC) set up in 1999 and currently operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Analysis shows that accusations of lack of impartiality, lack of security and lack of cooperation hampers United Nations Military Observers' (UNMOS) work.

The study concludes that different situations require different approaches as far as employment of UNMOS is concerned. In the contemporary operating environment, the United Nations should consider arming UNMOS according to the demands of the situation.

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## ACRONYMS

COU	Civilian Observer Unit
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
GAO	Government Accounting Office
MILOBS	Military Observers
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Mission Organization in Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNMOS	United Nations Military Observers
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in Kashmir
UNOGIL	United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Observer Mission in Yemen
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) is increasingly taking an active role in pursuit of conflict resolution in the world. The approach to conduct of peace operations has not changed much despite a significant change in conditions that existed when the world body initiated peace operations over half a century ago. The UN needs to reassess its mode of conducting peace operations if it is to adapt to the changes in peace support operations environment.

Military personnel and structure remain the backbone of peace operations, hence the continued employment of men and women in uniform in different roles in support of the UN's quest for conflict resolution worldwide. The military component in peace operations which normally works hand in hand with the civilian and civil police components, still operates under the same basic rules fifty five years later, despite experiences that would suggest a slightly different approach.

#### Background of the Problem

In May 1948 the Security Council decided to establish a field operation to supervise a fragile truce in the first Arab-Israeli war. Two weeks later, an initial group of thirty six military observers arrived in the Middle East as the first UN peacekeepers. These pioneers of observer missions were, and remain today, unarmed.<sup>1</sup>

Common to all forms of peacekeeping operations, observation is a primary responsibility of the peacekeeper and a basic requirement of his role. The main functions of an observer are to monitor everything that happens within his area of responsibility and to provide timely and accurate reports of any situation, incident, or suspicious



occurrence that develops.<sup>2</sup> Within the UN, observers carry out such duties as part of the military component of peace operations and are commonly known as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOS).

It is necessary to look into the origins of observation missions. The UN decided to employ observer missions for the simple reason that they had unambitious and limited mandates. It was less politically contentious to create an observation mission than a larger peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. Because of the restricted mandates the missions were small, relatively inexpensive and had a modest operational profile that generally did not bring controversy. As a rule, UNMOS themselves could not fulfill their observation mandates because of their small force and the large amount of space under their “control.”

The observation missions relied entirely on the cooperation and goodwill of the belligerents. The consent and cooperation of the belligerents towards the UN forces were reinforced by the unquestioned neutrality and impartiality shown by the UNMOS during the missions.<sup>3</sup> The reliance on belligerent cooperation, the innocuous political mandates of the UN missions, and the modest military capabilities of the UNMOS meant that they did not have the ability to plan or operate independently of those they were sent to observe. Acting only with the consent and cooperation of the belligerents, acting with strict impartiality, and adopting only a passive posture were the pillars of UNMOS’ *modus operandi*.

The unique political characteristics and constraints of the United Nations helped form a distinctive doctrine for UN military observation missions. This doctrine made

these ad hoc and improvised operations somewhat inefficient and impotent from a purely military standpoint.<sup>4</sup>

It is noteworthy to mention that the same rules that apply in observation missions are applicable in the peacekeeping and enforcement missions where the observers are operating as part of the overall peacekeeping or peace enforcement mission. UN observation missions were not specifically mentioned in the UN charter, so no formal political mechanism was devised for creating and deploying a group of UNMOS. Improvisation in the political arena therefore became a prominent feature of the management of UN observation missions.

Depending on the circumstances, UN observer missions sprang up from many political processes. These fall into three categories: Security Council initiatives, local initiatives, and brokered requests for assistance.<sup>5</sup> The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), established in 1948, was the direct result of Security Council efforts to establish a truce in the Middle East.<sup>6</sup> The United Nations Military Observer Group (UNMOGIP) in Kashmir and the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), which operated for six months in Lebanon in 1958 were both created as a response to local initiatives. UNMOGIP was a result of India accusing Pakistan of sponsoring Muslim terrorists in Kashmir, while UNOGIL was authorized in response to charges by the Lebanese Government that Syria (then linked to Egypt as the United Arab Republic) was smuggling arms and terrorists into Lebanon in an attempt to destabilize the regime.<sup>7</sup>

The majority of UN observation missions come from political agreements. The United Nations Observation Mission in Yemen (UNYOM) was a result of a U.S.-

brokered agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The initial UN observer mission in Angola (UNAVEM 1) was the result of internationally mediated agreements between Cuba, Angola, and South Africa in 1988.<sup>8</sup>

The most common trend among all these missions is that they all resulted from political agreement among belligerents. This most basic of political conditions had to be in place before the UNMOS were deployed. Unlike enforcement missions, where the military forces themselves could greatly influence and even create the environment needed for their success, observation missions had to accept the environment to which they were deployed.

One must therefore always remember that in operations at this end of the spectrum of UN military operations, the principles of consent, impartiality, and the passive use of military forces placed the prime determinant of mission success squarely in the hands of the belligerents, not with the UNMOS.

While forming observation missions, the *modus operandi* reflected in the principles of peacekeeping does apply. The tenets of that doctrine that influenced the forming of a force of UNMOS were that: (1) because the UN needed the consent and cooperation of the belligerents, the force was constructed with final approval reserved for the belligerents; (2) the force was structured on equitable geographic representation from member states; (3) the force was composed of national forces from neutral states and did not include great power participation; and (4) the force was structured on the assumption that military observers had the moral authority of their UN status and could not resort to force of arms.<sup>9</sup>

The UN charter authorizes use of its civil servants in observation duties. However, the UN felt that seasoned military professionals would be more suited for observation duties because of their technical expertise about military operations, gained through years of professional study and experience.

It was also felt that professional military officers in UN observation missions commanded the respect of their counterparts among the belligerents. Traditionally, military members of warring factions often were more hostile to a civil servant or bureaucrat than a fellow in the profession of arms.<sup>10</sup>

Observation forces always operated in difficult and inhospitable terrain. Between 1948 and 1996 over fifty UNMOS lost their lives in observation operations. One of the most horrific episodes included the 1988 kidnapping, torture, and hanging of a United States (US) officer serving as an UNMO in UNTSO.<sup>11</sup>

As of now, UNMOS still operate under the same guidelines and rules that maintain them as weak participants within the missions and only act within constraints mostly dictated by the willingness on the part of the belligerents. UNMOS are still employed to patrol buffer zones between hostile parties, monitor and investigate ceasefire violations, and conduct mediation where necessary.

### The Research Question

The UN has steadily continued to employ unarmed observers in its peace operations since the beginning of conflict resolution operations. This is so despite the experiences by UNMOS which would suggest a different approach. This thesis will assess the pros and cons of continued use of unarmed observers and answer the question: Should the UN continue to employ unarmed military observers?

To answer this question, this thesis will focus on three questions. First, how effective have UNMOS been in support of peace operations? Second, what conditions have changed that would require a review on the employment of UNMOS? Third, what effect will changing the observers' status have on peace operations?

### Definitions

The doctrinal definition of peace operations is found in the US Army field manual FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. The manual defines peace operations as multiagency operations involving diplomatic and humanitarian agencies with the military in support to prevent, contain a complex emergency, redress of peace, or shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding. Peace operations encompass peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.<sup>12</sup> Military observers, being part of the efforts in either peacekeeping or peace enforcement, fall in this category of operations.

From a different perspective, peacekeeping, while not mentioned anywhere in the UN Charter, is often referred to in the words of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953-61) as Chapter Six and a Half because it falls between Chapter VI of the Charter, which calls for the peaceful resolution of conflict and Chapter VII on the use of enforcement measures should negotiation fail. The development of Chapter Six and a Half was the product of a sensible US decision that international enforcement measures were impractical.<sup>13</sup> This thesis appropriately uses this version.

### Limitations

The UN is an umbrella body for all nations. The documents that are used for this study are not classified. The documents are available freely and are accessible through the Internet. A few books are being used and are supplemented by websites. The author has not come across any classified documents and will therefore limit the research to unclassified information.

### Delimitations

Since UN missions have been around for quite sometimes and are currently operating in several areas, the topic is likely to cover many areas and extremely widen the research. This thesis will therefore narrow down and focus the research to three missions, ranging from inception of observation operations, the evolving of such operations and current missions within existing conditions. Analysis will be restricted to three case studies, UNTSO: United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and United Nations Organization Mission in Congo (MONUC) which provide insights from different perspectives. Only unclassified sources relevant to the case studies will be used.

### Significance of the Study

The world is evolving and the conditions that existed fifty years ago have changed significantly. It is apparent that the UN will continue to arbitrate in conflicts and hence is likely to continue in the same manner of operations that has existed since its inception. Observer missions, which are easily the commonest, will continue to be conduits for the UN's pursuit of conflict resolution.

The study should bring out problems that bedevil UNMOS in the course of performing their duties in these missions. The study also examines the conduct of

UNMOS to facilitate a better understanding of the way they operate, and whether it is necessary to review their structure and *modus operandi* as far as the use of arms is concerned.

Lastly, the study should evaluate the positive side of the current mode of employment of UNMOS and determine why the UN has for a long time relied on them for peace operations, bearing in mind that the UN is the only refuge for countries that seek peaceful settlements in international disputes.

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<sup>1</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace keeping* (New York: UN Publication, 1985), 15-18.

<sup>2</sup>International Peace Academy, *Peacekeepers Handbook* (New York: UN Publication, 1984), 86.

<sup>3</sup>John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: Benchmark Production, 1998), 33.

<sup>4</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 35.

<sup>7</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 15.

<sup>8</sup>Hillen, *Blue Helmets*:

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.*, 37-38.

<sup>10</sup>*Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>11</sup>*Ibid.*, 38-40.

<sup>12</sup>US Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), 4-2.

<sup>13</sup>Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference* (New York: Foreign Policy Association and the Ford Foundation, 1990), 9.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

The key to understanding observer operations and observation missions is a thorough research of the background in this area. Since the overall intention is to analyze the feasibility of continued employment of unarmed military observers, it is important to make use of documents that provide analytical overview of the experiences of UNMOS. The documents that are used in this thesis are therefore both descriptive and analytical. To have a good insight into and understanding of the type of operation under scrutiny, documents that provide a general idea of what peace support operations are all about are also used. The categorization of these documents therefore simplifies understanding of the spectrum in peace operations.

#### Descriptive Documents

These are the documents that give a good background of the picture. The US Army field manual FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, is the basic document that gives an introduction to this subject. The manual talks of observation missions as “missions performed primarily by unarmed military observers (MILOBS) but may also be performed by peacekeeping forces. In either case, observer forces help ensure that the parties to the dispute follow the agreements. UN observer groups may also use civilian personnel or police as observers. The success of these missions depends on the willingness of the disputing parties to cooperate with the terms of the accord or agreement. This willingness may exist because MILOBS have established a visible presence and are able to detect agreement violations.”<sup>1</sup>



The *Peacekeepers Handbook* by the International Peace Academy also provides a basic guidance on peacekeeping operations and what is expected of an observer. Clearly outlining the operational procedures normally followed in observation duties, the document also gives a detailed insight into the legal implications of various observation tasks.

The *Blue Helmets* by John Hillen articulates the work of observation missions since their inception in 1948 up to the time the book was written in 1998. This is the most relevant document in so far as the observer work is involved. The book starts with the background of the UN Charter, the role of the Security Council, the Secretariat and the Secretary General, the spectrum of the UN military operations and the general performance of the peacekeeping missions throughout the world. The most important part of the book is the exhaustive way in which it covers observation missions. Hillen talks of why the observer missions are making up the majority of UN missions and gives a good reason for that. However, as he puts it: “Militarily they represent the low end of the operational spectrum because of both the negligible military effort employed and the generally benign environment which they operated. These missions consisted of no more than a few hundred military observers who were unarmed or were equipped with side arms only.”<sup>2</sup>

Very few documents focus directly on UNMOS. Partly because in many cases they are employed within peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions and their effort is geared to success of the overall mission. Still some documents have specifically targeted observation missions and give a good account of the observers’ experiences, although in a general way as opposed to individual perspectives.

### Analytical Documents

The nature of this research calls for documents that give an analytical view of the experiences in different environments, therefore, the information is sourced from materials that are partly historical in nature.

*Keeping the Peace* by N. D. White reviews many peace operation missions are including UNPROFOR, which is one of the case studies in this research. The document provides a background of the UN's creation after the demise of the League of Nations, and dwells on the organization of the organs of the UN and their relevance in peace support operations.

*The Blue Helmets*, a review of United Nations peacekeeping operations, gives a good in-depth analysis of the initial observation mission operations and is detailed concerning specific missions. It covers the UNTSO mission since 1948. A wealth of information on the first observation mission, which also happens to be the first of the three case studies, is available in this book. The book covers in detail the observer operations in the Arab-Israeli conflict area and also touches on other observation missions. UNMOGIP and other UN observation operations in Lebanon, Yemen and Dominican Republic are also well documented.

On 26-27 November 1996, a seminar titled *Facing the Future* was held in Japan between Canadian and Japanese personnel. The purpose was to discuss and chart a way forward in peace support operations. "Today's peacekeeping operations are very different from the Suez where it all began. Our traditional understanding of peacekeeping is now supplemented by peacemaking and the New Peacekeeping Partnership. Conferences of this kind help us to reexamine our thinking about the role of peacekeeping so that it can

remain an effective and relevant tool.”<sup>3</sup> The essence of the document is that it reflects on the thoughts of the participants in recognizing that times have changed, and therefore the approach to peacekeeping should also evolve in conformity. The focus of this research, although concerned with a specific type of peace operation, echoes similar observations. Thomas K.D. Geburt, a participant, comments on Peacekeeping Spectrum: “As the original concepts of peacekeeping calls for observation and monitoring the compliance of an agreement or ceasefire it is prudent to carry out these missions with observers. United Nations Military Observers (UNMOS) are deployed in teams, usually along or in a zone of separation, to observe both parties to the conflict. Observer missions are authorized under Chapter 6 of the Charter and UNMOS tend to be unarmed, deriving their protection instead from the fact that they pose no physical threat to the parties.”<sup>4</sup> The United Nations experience in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia is well documented in the book *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994* by James Mayall. The book gives a broad picture of the conditions that existed in these areas when the United Nations decided to intervene. The important issue brought forth in this book is the cold war era and the effect it had in the shaping of all the crises in these areas. The document approaches the post-cold war operations of the UN in three different perspectives as portrayed by the three cases: Cambodia--to implement a previously negotiated political agreement; in the former Yugoslavia--to devise a credible division labor and authority between the UN and the European Union; and in Somalia--to mount a humanitarian mission in a country without a government.

While most documents generally provide specific experiences in different missions, *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s* by Frederick H. Fleitz Jr. dwells much

deeper in the ten year period between 1992 and 2002, and gives a good insight into the modern day problems in conducting peacekeeping operations. On a wider picture, Fleitz intimates that as a result of the cold war the UN was rendered incapable of playing the collective security-promoting role intended by its founders.<sup>5</sup> The document touches on the problems in various missions including MONUC, one of the missions focused on in this thesis.

*The Blue Helmets*, 3rd edition, (1996) wraps up the experiences by the UN in almost all areas where peacekeeping and enforcement has taken place. In a solemn manner, the document points out what happened in Srebrenica in 1995, after adoption of resolution 995. Generally this book underscores the weakness of the UN as a whole. It notes that the freedom of UNPROFOR personnel was continuously severely restricted.<sup>6</sup> While the document provides insights into the UN's achievements and debacles, it is noteworthy to mention that UNMOS, as organic members in UN operations, are also put in scrutiny. The book notes that UNPROFOR positions were overrun and a large number of humanitarian abuses were inflicted on the population. Mass and arbitrary detention of civilian population (men and boys) and summary executions occurred.<sup>7</sup> The documents therefore is a testimonial to the UN forces' impotence especially that of the observers who could not even deter attacks on themselves.

*Soldiers Without Enemies* by Larry Fabian shows how basic principles in conflict resolutions must be protected and maintained. Inderjit Rikhye's *The Thin Blue Line* examines the peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and emphasizes the lessons that are still to be learned in peacekeeping. The document compares the UN experiences in three case studies: the Middle East, Congo and Cyprus. But the book also provides a

sorry picture as far as observers are concerned. The book intimates that operations for observers are a stressful experience. The problems that face an observer or observer missions and the limitations under which they have to operate are not generally appreciated or gauged. Lacking the strength of a backup force and denied adequate freedom of movement in the exercise of their tasks, they are wholly dependent on the cooperation and assistance of the disputants for the extent to which they can fulfill their mandate. It is not overly surprising that this cooperation is not always forthcoming and that such missions, though accepted or requested by the disputants in the first instance, are subsequently ignored, only being used by either side when it suits its purposes to do so.<sup>8</sup> Ironically, the document showers praises on the part of observers for being able to perform their unenviable task, unenviable because of frustrations and dangers attendant upon their role that constitutes a deterring influence which, though not preventing fighting, has discouraged the more openly hostile acts that undoubtedly would occur if there are no observers present.<sup>9</sup> This two-way analysis is important and valuable input in the research.

*Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis*, edited by M. Weller, is an account of the events in the west African state which led to intervention by both the UN and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and provides an excellent account of experience by observers who have served in the Mission. The document provides a chronology of events which led to the intervention in the country by both ECOWAS and the UN. The document compiled a list of the reports and incidents as they were unfolding and attests to the experiences and inputs of UNMOS. Though the document is only being used as a reference to some of the issues

concerning observer operations, it is imperative that the occurrences are brought forth as testimony to what observers were expected to do and their perspective on that mission.

The observers tasks as given in the book were to “monitor and verify cantonment, disarmament, the storage of recovered arms, ammunition and explosives, and demobilization, UNOMIL would also late teams at cantonment sites and armouries.”<sup>10</sup> The document reported “Should ECOMOG enter into planned peace enforcement involving combat operations, UNOMIL observers will not participate in such actions and would along with other United Nations staff, be temporarily withdrawn from the area; should ECOMOG find itself constrained to enter into unplanned, self-defensive military actions, ECOMOG would have the obligation to ensure the security of UNOMIL observers and other United Nations staff present in the area.”<sup>11</sup> The document highlights the relegation of military professionals to a position where they, although in uniform, have to be treated like civilians since they could do nothing for their own security.

Another good source of material is William Durch’s *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*, which provides lessons from several case studies and comparative analysis of peacekeeping and observer missions operations. Durch dwells much on peacekeeping during the cold war and says that many peacekeeping operations were politically possible then because they helped to avoid direct clashes between the then opposite ideological blocks. Peacekeeping missions often served the West’s interests in regional stability. In the new era, peacekeeping has become a permanent occupation as the UN finds more and more requests for intervention. Durch is also cautious in that success and failure in peacekeeping are not readily definable in black and white terms.<sup>12</sup>

Dr. Mala Tabory's *The Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai* is a key document in the research as it covers entirely one area of a case study. The Middle East, being the arena of Arab-Israeli conflicts due to the long historical problem, is well covered by Dr Tabory. The book provides the background on the establishment of the multinational force in 1981. However, this document is only used because the environment by which UNMOS operate is clearly defined, albeit the fact that some of the observers are civilians from the civilian observer unit (COU).

The other analytical document that is used for the Middle East experiences is the *Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East* by Robert B. Houghton. The General Accounting Office (GAO) report to congressional committees dwells on the limitations in missions requiring force to restore peace. A valuable source of information is the Lester B Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The Center's website that is very helpful is <http://www.cdnpeacekeeping.ns.ca>.

Various journals, *Janes Defense Weekly*, and other available information give additional assessment and views of different researchers on the subject. Material on MONUC, which is a case study, is mainly available through the Internet. The mission is extensively covered in current UN journals. Finally, the UN library is an excellent source of information that is used in the thesis.

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<sup>1</sup>US Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2002), 4-3.

<sup>2</sup> John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of United Nations Military Operations*, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: Benchmark Production, 1998), 18.

<sup>3</sup>"Facing the Future," *Proceedings of the 1996 Canada-Japan Conference on Modern Peacekeeping* (Clementsport: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1997), 3.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 4.

<sup>5</sup>Frederick H. Fleitz Jr., *Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and U.S. Interests* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 34.

<sup>6</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: UN Publication, 1996), 558.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 559.

<sup>8</sup>Inderjit Rikhye, *The Thin Blue Line: International Peacekeeping and Its Future* (New York: Yale University Press, 1974), 121.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>M. Weller, *Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 376.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., 377.

<sup>12</sup>William J. Durch, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis* (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 12.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research has been done using primary sources available at the Combined Arms Research Library and from the Internet. The first step was to build a good background knowledge on UN peace operations. Ideally, to answer the primary question, it was necessary to get to the crux of the operations and get to know the ideas behind the current methods of operation. To successfully do that it was imperative that the documents used had to be reflective of the very early years of the UN's conflict resolution, in this case over fifty years old. The author, having served the UN in peace operations in Angola, was better positioned to understand and make a critical analysis of the problem, although from a later perspective.

Step two has been done in a three-pronged manner. Emphasis has been put on studying three case studies because of the variations in time and conditions, mostly political, which they offer. There have been very many UN peace operations since its inception, but the author selected the three because each represents a different image in terms of culture, time, geography, environment and the reasons for its establishment.

The three case studies used are UNTSO, UNPROFOR, and MONUC. It is important to note that the research was intended to get to the underlying reason for the UN's decision to employ unarmed observers. Therefore, the first case study was chosen primarily to assess the implications of the use of observers and their mode of operations and the outcome which seemed to have promulgated the employment of UNMOS to this date. The case study was to assess the implications of the ideas and possibly the

acceptance of the UNMOS by the belligerents, if they had any input into the decision and whether their being unarmed was a unilateral decision by the UN or if it was conditional on the belligerents. It was also necessary since the mission was set up when the world was polarized between the Western and Eastern ideological blocks. The implications to the political environment as a result of the influence needed to be scrutinized. Being the first UN's mission, the experiences of the UNMOS must have charted a way forward for their further employment in subsequent missions. It was therefore necessary to evaluate the mission and study the lessons that came up.

Case study two was to analyze the performance of UNMOS under different conditions. The case study was chosen by the simple fact that at the time it was set up, the world was undergoing change in so far as geopolitics was concerned and it was the purpose of the research to find out if the changes had any bearing on the operations of the observers. The political conditions were different from case study one, and the physical conditions and environment were also different. The challenges that UNMOS faced were of a different nature. The difference in timings also meant that the study could provide a different perspective to the research question. The mission was also dealing with an ethno-based internal conflict as opposed to the first case study, which had a lot of outside interests and influence.

Case study three is an ongoing mission. The mission represents the modern-day reality of peacekeeping. The world has been reshaped, the mission is under different conditions--geographically, politically and timing--from the first two, and it provides a current picture of the observer operations and what they portend. The author wanted to find out why the UN still employs UNMOS without arms and whether that does more

harm than good. If, going by the records, the observers are at times impotent in their performance due to their inability to defend themselves, what is it that makes the UN rigidly employ them within the context of their current limitations?

The case studies came from the literature that the author had reviewed, especially the first two. The documents for the third mission are mostly current web material as situations keep changing, even as he was conducting the research. It was important to visualize how the observer operations might look if operations were conducted in a different way.

The using of UNMOS in the present *modus operandi* must also be looked into from a positive perspective. It was the intention of the research to find out how effective the UNMOS are in the way they conduct their operations. One of the reasons why they are possibly employed is due to their status as being accepted by the belligerents. It was necessary to establish whether their being unarmed had anything to do with the agreement by belligerents to allow them to be part of the effort.

Differentiating between observers and peacekeepers could have been also a reason for having them unarmed. It was also important to verify this. Possibly the reasons why the belligerents agreed to enter into a peace treaty was that there will be UNMOS who will be trusted with the monitoring and reporting of accurate developments according to the ceasefire agreements or truce. The research was therefore driven by these queries.

Finally, the author's experience as an UNMO also contributed immensely in the thesis. Despite the research being limited to the three case studies, the author believes that

they represent the very many intricacies of both observation missions and UNMOS as a whole.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

This chapter has been divided into two parts. Part one deals with a short background on the origins of observation missions. It examines the rationale behind the formation of observation missions, the reasons why observation of truce or ceasefire should be conducted by unarmed observers, the implication of employing observers within the confines of peacekeeping forces and expectations from the effort. Part two is dedicated to case studies: UNTSO set up in the Middle East in 1948, UNPROFOR in the Balkans in 1992 and MONUC in Africa since 2000, are examined. The purpose was to get an understanding of the experiences by the UNMOS in these missions, their effectiveness and their shortcomings, and the way these related to the mandates of the missions, political conditions and the environment under which they were set up.

In analyzing the missions, the focus was on gauging whether UNMOS were effective or not. By revisiting the mandates, it was possible to appraise and determine the expected input from the UNMOS. Were they able to fulfill their duties according to expectations? If they were, what were the attributes? If not, what were the impediments?

#### Background

UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally fallen into two categories: observer missions, which consist largely of officers who are almost invariably unarmed; and peacekeeping forces, which consist of lightly armed infantry units, with the necessary logistic support elements. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. Infantry and logistic units sometimes reinforce observer missions, usually for a specific purpose and a brief period of time. Peacekeeping was not created to solve a conflict or dispute;

rather, its purpose was to try and maintain the peace and calm on the front lines in order to buy time for the peacemakers to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the combatants.<sup>1</sup>

When peacekeepers are interposed between warring countries, they tend to deploy along borders, thereby creating areas of separation, or buffer zones. But when they are inserted in a civil or internal war, boundaries are by no means easily drawn. So peacekeepers often are forced to shift internal lines in an effort to stop bloodshed.<sup>2</sup> Situations therefore determine how and when to deploy observers or peacekeeping forces.

Observation missions make up majority of UN missions. This is because of the many advantages that they provide when compared to formed forces. There are benefits accrued from these, chiefly the cost and organization, which are considerably scaled down when compared with operating the latter. The UN, therefore, structures such missions in a way that could substitute, where possible, fully formed forces. In *Blue Helmets*, John Hillen argues that because of this, the UN initiated a total of twenty observation missions between 1948 and 1996.<sup>3</sup> Observers were generally composite group of officers recruited from member states, chosen from “neutral” countries to make up an equitable balance and to reinforce the appearances of impartiality.<sup>4</sup> Generally, peacekeeping operations are supposed to exercise impartiality when dealing with conflicts. Experiences in earlier operations have shown that when non-intervention and impartiality were lacking, this created problems.

The belligerent parties under UN observation had the power of veto over force composition and methods of operation. Thus, the key to success in observation missions was the goodwill and cooperation of the belligerents. Naturally this left UN military

observers beholden to the vagaries of their political environment. Because of this, decisions about force structure, command and control, and military objectives were far more subject to political sensitivities than purely military requirements.

Because observation missions were completely reliant on the consent and cooperation of the belligerents for their success, there was no need for an overwhelming military presence on the part of the UN, one that no doubt would have had some trouble mobilizing. Observation missions were a self-help technique, and the belligerents provided for the bulk of the “help.” As such, the authority of the UN forces was largely moral and political, not military. UNMOS rarely had the military manpower to carry out their mandate effectively without the active cooperation of belligerents and certainly had no power actively to coerce belligerents into cooperation. If in fact UNMOS were in danger of a bellicose environment and noncooperative belligerents, they were usually withdrawn or reduced significantly.<sup>5</sup> The employment of UNMOS was possible only when the parties agree as part of their peace plan to accommodate them, and apparently this mostly happened only when it suited the belligerents to do so.

Ever since UNTSO, military observers have been deployed unarmed, the reasoning being that possible antagonists would be less likely to use their arms against unarmed personnel.<sup>6</sup> While this may be true, it does not entirely eliminate the danger from uncontrolled groups outside the sphere of recognized political authorities with whom the UN can conclude the necessary political and practical agreements. Even then, circumstances might dictate that observers be armed, although in very special cases. In the *African Security Review*, Larry Forster points out how the rule was broken in 1989,

when observers of the UN Transition Assistance Group were authorized to carry side arms for self-protection against wild animals in certain parts of Namibia.<sup>7</sup>

UNMOS status symbolizes impartiality. Even though the decision to form an observer mission independently or within formed forces is situation dependent, an observer mission that would be able to realize and create favorable conditions commensurate to what formed forces can achieve is always desirable. At times it is necessary to deploy UNMOS as a prelude to a larger peacekeeping outfit. This is what the UN does in most cases. Accurate reporting of incidents and developments as they occur is the main functions of observers, and doing so without any bias is the hallmark of observer duties. The security of the UNMOS as a result of unarmed status, cooperation expected from the belligerents, and unhindered access to zones and facilities that would be necessary to monitor, so as to facilitate success of the mission are always desirable.

#### Case Study One: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

##### Background

In the Middle East, Palestine was a territory administered by the United Kingdom under a Mandate from the League of Nations. The territory had a population of about 2 million, two thirds of whom were Arabs and one-third Jews. The United Kingdom Mandate expired in April 1947 and both communities laid claims to the control of the entire territory. The British Government took the matter to the General Assembly, which in turn adopted a plan by a Special Committee to partition the territory into an Arab State and a Jewish State with an international regime for Jerusalem. The Palestinian Arabs and Arab States did not accept the plan. Violent fighting broke out, and immediately the



Jewish agency proclaimed the State of Israel on the territory allotted under the partition plan. The Palestinian Arabs and Arab States opened hostilities against Israel.

The Security Council called for a truce that ended the war, and decided that a mediator would supervise it with the assistance of military observers. The first United Nations peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), came into being as a consequence.<sup>8</sup> UNTSO's mandate was "to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine."<sup>9</sup>

Resolution 50 (1948) thus instructed:

The United Nations Mediator in Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission, to supervise the observance of the above provisions and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of observers.<sup>10</sup>

The volatile nature of the crisis required strict and continuous monitoring to prevent any outbreak of hostilities. UNMOS were necessary for monitoring of the truce. However, an absolute ceasefire needed strong deterrence to ensure total and permanent cessation of hostilities. The huge size of armies involved and the potential for re-emergence of fighting was clearly discernible. Nevertheless, it was a matter of urgency that the situation be contained, hence the creation of the mission. As a manifestation of how convenient it is to set up observer missions as opposed to peacekeeping forces, the arrangements for the group of UNMOS were put in place without guidelines and were implemented within a period of less than two weeks between adoption of the Council's resolution and the effective truce.<sup>11</sup>

## Truce Supervision

In establishing the mission, conditions that were necessary for observer operations were addressed. On a wider picture, the mission should have been structured towards providing a buffer against any outbreak of hostilities; that is, a demilitarized zone should have been occupied by formed forces, equipped and capable of enforcing any UN resolution in case of breach of the truce. Peacekeeping forces were to be deployed much later in 1956, after almost a decade of UNTSO's existence, and because of outbreak of war.

Impartiality was necessary as the core ingredient of peacekeeping. However, this came to be tested even at the early stages of the mission. UNTSO is a mission that was formed during the Cold War era where many decisions that were made were in a way connected to the political murkiness and always reflected the geopolitical state of affairs. For example, the participation of great powers (read the US and USSR) went against the tenets of the formation of observer missions, which considered participation of such powers as improper.

The process of establishing UNTSO began in early May 1948 when a Truce Commission set up by the Security Council requested the Council to send military observers to assist it. The UN decided that the Mediator (Count Folke Bernadotte, of Sweden) in concert with the Truce Commission should supervise the truce and be provided with sufficient number of military observers. While these arrangements were being made, the beginnings of what were to become different positions on the questions of authority became discernible.<sup>12</sup> The Soviet Union made known its views that selection

of military observers should be decided by the Security Council and expressed the hope that Soviet observers would be appointed. The Council did not support this view.<sup>13</sup>

It is easy to perceive that interests in the then bipolar world sometimes made it difficult for the UN to completely act without inclinations connected to power struggles as the powers used their vetoes to serve their political interests. Hillen, in the *Blue Helmets* notes that because of lack of sovereign powers, the UN was forced to improvise,<sup>14</sup> thereby allowing outside dictation. Even though Soviet observers were included in later years, this did not expunge the feelings of political suspicion. Even then, instructions to the UNMOS were clear on impartiality.

Fundamental objective of terms of truce is to ensure to fullest extent possible that no military advantage will accrue to either side as a result of application of truce. Observer is entitled to demand that acts contrary to terms of truce be not committed or be rectified but has no power to enforce such demands and must rely largely upon his ability to settle disputes locally by direct approaches to local commanders and authorities and where possible by bringing the commanders and authorities together. It is responsibility of the observer to call promptly to attention of appropriate local commanders and authorities every act which in his opinion is contrary to letter and spirit of truce.<sup>15</sup>

Impartiality was necessary to further the cause of the mission and achieve desired goals in as far as the truce was concerned. This became crucial because initially; certain countries were not acceptable to Israel and others not to Egypt. Specifically, Israel did not want Soviet observers while Egypt refused UNMOS from the US. There were fears, from both sides that having observers from countries that had any interest or could be affected by any change of situation, might jeopardize their security and provide their adversary with an “edge,” the very thing that UNTSO was expected to curtail. This was resolved after lengthy discussions, which resulted into observers drawn from “neutral” countries.

UNMOS duties were to supervise the Armistice Agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors, which resulted from the subsequent fighting in the region. To facilitate this, the mediator requested for twenty one observers from each of the states members of the Truce Commission (Belgium, France, and United States), with a further five colonels coming from his own country to act as his personal representatives in supervising the truce.

Security of the UNMOS was of paramount importance. In the absence of armed peacekeepers, the provision of security was solely the responsibility of the belligerents. The instructions were clear on this: "Observer shall be entitled to request and receive from both parties, armed protection for himself, his staff and material and safe conduct whenever necessary in discharge of his duties."<sup>16</sup> This was not necessarily guaranteed and hence the parties to the conflict were required to cooperate with the observers, to whom the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations applied, and ensure their safety and freedom of movement.<sup>17</sup>

However, suspicion and mistrust were a common thing. The mediator was assassinated and there emerged an unending cycle of violence marked by Palestinian commando raids and Israeli reprisals in the border areas and also recurrence of cease-fire violations by all the states. Jewish terrorists who belonged to the Stern Gang killed the Mediator, after accusing him of being a British agent and whose plan they considered a threat to its goal of an independent Israel with expanded territory on both sides of the Jordan River.<sup>18</sup> This incident, though not supported by the Israeli government, exposed the effects of any feelings of bias, real or perceived.

Security in general was a prickly issue due to the environment they operated in. When a civil war broke out in Lebanon, UNMOS manning the observation posts were left on their own in an increasingly difficult situation, since the Lebanese army that had been protecting them disintegrated. On a number of occasions, as a result of breakdown in law and order, observers' vehicles were hijacked and their observation posts broken into by one faction or another.<sup>19</sup> However, generally, the fighting factions respected the status of the UNMOS. When established institutions were in place, it was possible to organize and cater for their security. Any breakdown in law and order was catastrophic.

When two UNMOS were killed after heavy shelling between Israel and Syrian forces occurred, the security of all UNMOS appeared jeopardized. The Security Council closed all observation posts on both sides of the Canal and UNMOS were withdrawn to Cairo area.<sup>20</sup> Even though this was a request by one of the belligerents (Egypt), it was a major set back to the mission. Following the closure of the observation posts, the UN no longer had direct information on the hostilities between Egypt and Israel that were raging in the western part of the Sinai. It was an unfortunate incident, which impacted negatively on the mission and reversed any gains that had been made. This incident also attested to the importance of having the UNMOS in the area. Withdrawing them was like shutting down the "eyes" of the United Nations.

The success for the mission required total cooperation from the belligerents. Apparently this lacked in some instances. Observers were entitled to inspect all military positions, installations and other premises, which could reasonably be connected with application of truce, as well as ships, aircraft and convoys. The purpose of such inspection was "to ascertain that no activity was carried on in any such place, which

could result in any military advantage accruing to either side during the truce.”<sup>21</sup> These were requirements on the UNMOS, which were necessitated by the need for efficiency and adherence to the Truce. In 1956, UNTSO observers continued to conduct patrols on the Egyptian side of Armistice Demarcation Line. These patrols were largely symbolic as by then, the Israeli Government had refused to cooperate. Even though the mandate permitted such activities, major impediments at this time came from the Truce signatories. On one occasion, the UNMOS made an attempt to demarcate a line of separation in the Port Fuad area, but no agreement could be reached.<sup>22</sup>

UNTSO’s limitations meant that UNMOS were able to only monitor and report the situation as it developed, but any escalation of violence was out of their domain. What weighted down on them was the responsibility in handling incidents violating the truce.

In dealing with local incidents observer shall make clear to parties concerned that full responsibility will be borne by them and by their Governments for failure to comply with ruling of observer in connection with actions and incidents relating to application of truce. Observer should exercise reasonable discretion in each instance in order to minimize unpleasant incidents and local friction.<sup>23</sup>

As there was no element of enforcement on their part, UNMOS had to solely bank on their “relevance” for any deterrence. In *The Blue Helmets* this is portrayed as their ultimate weapon. The document asserts that “their very presence was something of a deterrence to violations of the truce and, acting on the basis of United Nations resolutions, they exercised a degree of moral suasion.”<sup>24</sup> Considering that their work was to assist in supervising the truce this made sense, but of course they could not stop the wars, which recurred a number of times.

## Conclusion

So how effective were the UNMOS with UNTSO?

Arabs could kill Israeli citizens across the border, blockade our Port of Eilat, close the Suez Canal to our shipping, send armed groups into our territory for murder and havoc, and decline to carry out stipulated clauses of the armistice agreement in the complete certainty that the Security Council would not adopt even the mildest resolution of criticism. . . . On the other hand, there was no inhibition to resolutions criticizing Israel for retaliating against attacks. Thus the doctrine of the United Nations came to imply that Arab governments could conduct warfare and maintain belligerency against Israel while Israel could offer no response.<sup>25</sup>

As the first UN mission, UNTSO set the stage for subsequent UN operations.

Several issues come to mind if anyone tries to draw conclusions about the mission. As much as impartiality was practiced, this cannot be said to have been the perception by the belligerents. Complaints against the UN (UNTSO) reflected opinions that suggested the UNMOS were at times taking sides. This may not be true, but the killing of the Mediator and complaints by Israel to the UN suggested some dissatisfaction.

On security, the vulnerability of UNMOS was evident, especially in later years.

Dr Kurt Waldheim was the Secretary General when civil war broke out in Lebanon.

When insecurity threatened UNMOS he decided not to arm them, even though he had the option to do so. Arming the UNMOS would have changed the status of the UNMOS, and worst of all the moral authority of the UN would have gone.

When the Mediator was assassinated, it was largely due to the perception by the Jewish Stern gang that he was against their state but still reflected on security issue. The two UNMOS who were killed by shelling were caught in the crossfire. This effectively denied the mission valuable information as the UNMOS had to be withdrawn and could therefore not report on events. UNTSO demonstrated that UNMOS can be employed when their involvement is between established institutions that respect their status, but

with any collapse of authority, resumption of hostilities, or break down of law and order, their contribution to peace is not guaranteed.

Cooperation that was expected from the belligerents was sometimes missing. “Any failure to comply with conditions of truce on part of either party shall immediately be reported by the observer. Report to extent possible shall fully explain each such failure and shall clearly fix responsibility therefore.”<sup>26</sup> That is what the instructions said. Fixing responsibility was all right but was not necessarily enough to entice cooperation. It was upon the belligerents to decide and commit themselves to the provisions of the Truce. On a few occasions, the belligerents hindered accesses to some areas.

UNMOS were to take orders only from the United Nations authorities. This meant that the structure and chain of command of the mission was to be in control and thus no outside party could manipulate the UNMOS. Blue berets that would easily distinguish belligerents from peacekeepers came to be used much later in 1956, and made it a bit easier for the UNMOS to be identified, even at a distance.

UNTSO came to be appreciated when situations changed for the worse. Due to the fluid nature of the conflict, subsequent events in later years had their own effects on the mission. The Lebanese Government requested the UN, as a result of heightened tension in the Israel-Lebanon sector, to increase the number of observers, on the basis of the 1949 Armistice Agreement. The Security Council acceded to the demand, in recognition of the important role played by the UNMOS.

Even as the situation at times threatened to get out of hand and hostilities continued, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO decided, with the agreement of all parties, to establish more observation posts in response.<sup>27</sup> This always helped in easing tensions. In



most cases, though not in a position to offer any punitive measures, the mere presence of UNMOS helped to pacify volatile situations.

The mission was formed as a matter of urgency and necessity. It was accepted by all the groups that the only way to put in check activities of their adversary is to have UNMOS supervise the Truce. The various breakouts of hostilities only portrayed how impotent UNMOS are in such situations. They could observe and report, mediate and even arbitrate, but this was only when the belligerents cooperated, regardless of the provisions of the Truce. A good reminder that UNMOS can only succeed where the belligerents offer their unwavering support.

Today UNTSO observers are still in the region. Even though observers do not have the capability to prevent any fighting, they are excellent tools for “cooling things” when belligerents are ready for peace. This brings the question to mind--were the UNMOS effective? Yes, they were effective in conducting their observation and their restrictions only arose from the heightened suspicion between the belligerents who at times placed obstacles in pursuit of their own interests. They could not prevent the outbreak of wars as it was not within their capability to do so. Within their capability and in following the provisions of the mandate, they performed well, but whenever situations occurred which put them out of their domain, their role became insignificant.

In trying to relate the situation at the time and the way UNTSO was set up; it is safe to say that the decision to use UNMOS was realistic. Because the UN had no definitive resources, structures, procedures or mechanism confidently to competently mobilize, direct and deploy military forces, it had to do with whatever option that it had, which in this case was UNMOS.

## Case Study Two: United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

### Background

In the Balkans, the death of Josip Broz Tito had initiated the first cracks within the Yugoslav federation. The rigidities of the cold war international system held the country together for a while but the demise of communism dealt a fatal blow to the federation. Clamoring for independence resulted to fragmentation of the federation. The two dominant segments of the old state (Serbia and Croatia) were locked in rising tensions. The declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991 prompted the outbreak of war. Initial fighting appeared to be between the Yugoslav army and Croatian armed forces but it appeared as though the former was an instrument of Serbian policy.

The Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia, but the war lasted only 10 days and the Yugoslav Army withdrew. This conflict brought the international involvement in the crisis. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the rights and interests of the three main ethnic groups-- Muslims, Serbs and Croats--had been guaranteed under Tito's constitutional arrangements, but this seemed to be crumbling and the Serbs refused to take part in a referendum for an independent Bosnian republic, fearing that the other two groups would constantly outvote them.

The peculiar mix of populations and the uncertainty created by rival claims to the territory made it difficult to identify and accept territorial and administrative demarcations.<sup>28</sup> This had caused a problem to the UN, as it was difficult for any agency contemplating intervention to see a clear point of entry. No frontier could be established

behind which the intervention force could safely be assembled and from where it could move against a clearly located antagonist on the other side.<sup>29</sup>

All the happenings, therefore, created options for the international community. Should any purpose of intervention be humanitarian, intended to alleviate the sufferings of the civilians affected by the dispute, or should it be the assertion of the principle of the sanctity of frontiers? Or should it be a combination of the two? The former implied negotiation, mediation and peacekeeping, while the latter required enforcement and implied that there should be no compromise or impartiality.<sup>30</sup> The involvement of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) followed by the European Commission (EC)/European Union (EU) was not fruitful hence the intervention by the UN.

Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established on 21 February 1992 as an effort to quell the chaotic situation in the Balkans. The resolution followed several others that had been adopted, owing to the constant changing nature of the crisis. The mission was set up immediately after the crumble of the Soviet Union and therefore during the prospects of the “new world order” in 1991.<sup>31</sup> The UN had actually started active involvement in the Yugoslav crisis on 25 September 1991, when the Security Council, acting under chapter VII, unanimously passed resolution 713 which called for a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.”<sup>32</sup>

#### Intervention and Observation

By early 1992, the situation in the former Yugoslavia was one of increasing chaos and conflicting principles. There were two unfortunate aspects of the intervention: the

crisis in Yugoslavia was brutally complex, and the UN and the regional organizations were utterly inexperienced and unprepared for dealing with problems of peace and order in the post-cold war world.<sup>33</sup> In such circumstances, what was immediately required was an intervention that would create conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the crisis. This is what the UN mandate provided for in Croatia in March 1992.

Article 2(7) stated that nothing in the present UN Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in a dispute that is considered of a domestic nature, although it also stated that this article shall not prevent the UN from applying measures under Chapter VII. Therefore by applying the last part of Article 2(7), and with the support of all the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN was able to declare the continued fighting in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace and security and invoke article 39 of Chapter VII.<sup>34</sup> On March 8, UNPROFOR 1 began to deploy under the command of Indian General Satish Nambiar and on April 7, 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 749, authorizing the full deployment of the United Nations Protection Force.<sup>35</sup>

The force was deployed in three “United Nations Protected Areas” (UNPAs) in Croatia. UNPROFOR’s mandate was “to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all residing in them are protected.”<sup>36</sup> There were several enlargements of the mandate in Croatia; in June 1992 to include monitoring of certain areas in Croatia (called the ‘pink zones’) which were outside the agreed UNPA boundaries; in August 1992, to enable UNPROFOR to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions at the UNPA borders at international frontiers; and in October

1992, to include monitoring of the demilitarization of the peninsula near Dubrovnik and to ensure control of the Peruca dam situated in one of the pink zones.<sup>37</sup>

The question of whether UNMOS are necessary or not came to light in the early stages of the mission. UNPROFOR'S Mandate was initially associated with Croatia. However, it was envisioned that after demilitarization of the UNPAs, one hundred UNMOS would be re-deployed to areas in Bosnia.<sup>38</sup> The situation was rapidly changing and the Secretary General, while not being able to deploy a full peacekeeping force, decided to accelerate the deployment of the UNMOS in the Balkans by dispatching 40 to Bosnia in the regions of Mostar, Caplijina, Stolac, and Kapribinje. The convenience of deploying observers as a prelude to stronger peacekeeping forces was clearly demonstrated. Their task was to assess the possibility of a peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. As a precaution to prevent further hostilities, this was done in response to continued pressure from the international community, mainly members of the EC, to expand UNPROFOR into Bosnia.<sup>39</sup>

As with UNTSO, even with a complex operating environment, critical areas that had to be addressed were impartiality, security of the UNMOS, cooperation from the belligerents and unhindered access to areas requiring inspection. Even if the UN was to apply Chapter VII, the UNMOS would still be required to practice impartiality, because what was required of them was observation and accurate reporting of the truth, to earn the respect of the belligerents as opposed to the forces enforcing the mandate. Their security had to be provided for by UNPROFOR because they were operating within the force, and the belligerents could not guarantee their security. For the belligerents, cooperation was needed to enable the observers to perform their duties without hindrance.

However, throughout the duration of the mission, allegations of bias were common. Because of the complexity of the mission, allegations were not confined to UNMOS but also to the peacekeeping forces. Even then, this was not necessarily justified, and always had political connotations. At one time, the Secretary General reported that he had been sorely tempted to withdraw the force due to criticism of UNPROFOR by both sides and the dangers and abuses to which its personnel were exposed, but decided otherwise as he thought the step could result to further conflict.<sup>40</sup>

Major-General Lewis Mackenzie of the Canadian Armed Forces who served with UNPROFOR has written a memoir in which he gives an account of an incident in June 22, 1992, in which the UN was accused of giving vehicles to the Serbs to transport their soldiers. While negotiating he thus said:

We are not here to pass judgment on what is going on. We send objective reports to the UN everyday. It's the UN's job to identify the culprits. Our job is to open the airport and ensure the delivery of food and medicine. To do that, we have to negotiate with you and the Bosnian Serbs. If you can't live with that then my role as a negotiator is impossible. I need your cooperation. I also need you to tone down the anti-UNPROFOR rhetoric in the media. My command is committed to doing everything within our capability and our mandate to assist the people of Sarajevo, but we can't succeed without your co-operation.<sup>41</sup>

Assurances like these were common. Unfortunately, they did little to change the perception of bias. The belligerent's anti-UNPROFOR sentiments always seemed to make work difficult for UNMOS. Blaming the UN for all their woes seemed to be the preoccupation of the belligerents. This proved to be a big stumbling block whenever UNMOS attempted to implement various provisions of the mandate.

The security of UNMOS was jeopardized many times due to the complexity of the problem. This manifested itself as the UN, in one of the many resolutions that it passed due to the fluctuating of the situation, decided with Resolution 958 that:

The authorization given in paragraph 10 of its resolution 836(1993) to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) any necessary measures through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia And Herzegovina referred to in resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of Resolution 836 (1993) shall apply also to such measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.<sup>42</sup>

NATO, in accordance with the Resolution launched air strikes at Vobina airstrip located in the UNPA sector south in Croatia. In apparent retaliation, the Serbs detained a number of UNMOS, restricted their movements, and subjected some to humiliation.

At times threats to the UNMOS' security prompted them to seek assistance from the other UN forces. For example, UNMOS in Gorazde were forced to ask for NATO air protection on 10 April 1994. Two F16 aircraft dropped bombs under control of a UN Forward Air Controller.<sup>43</sup> This was after Bosnian Serb shelling endangered them. The UNPROFOR Command had requested NATO to use close air support for self-defense of the UN personnel. This was a good demonstration on the interoperability between UNMOS and enforcement troops. This worked well, but at times it worked to the disadvantage of the UNMOS when belligerents reacted to actions by NATO and resorted to using UNMOS as bargaining chips.

Cooperation from the belligerents was also not fully provided. A Government Accounting Office report revealed that UNPROFOR observers were frequently denied access to the international borders and therefore could not monitor them.<sup>44</sup> This negated exactly what the UNMOS were deployed to do. It is imperative to note that since UNMOS did not have the capability to enforce any of the resolutions, such tasks should have probably been carried out by the peacekeeping contingent.

UNPROFOR's mandate was further enlarged to enable it to support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and to protect convoys of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross so requested. In addition, since November 1992, UNPROFOR started monitoring compliance with the ban on all military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992. In April 1993 the Security Council declared Srebrenica a "safe area." In May it demanded that five more towns--Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac--be treated as "safe areas." It also authorized the strengthening of UNPROFOR's mandate by additional UNMOS to monitor the humanitarian situation in those areas.

By December 1992, in response to a request by the president of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), UNPROFOR was deployed there to monitor and report any developments in its border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in that Republic and threaten its territory. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, military aircraft were banned from flying in specific areas. The no-fly zone affected all aircraft with the exception of UNPROFOR flights. UNMOS were tasked to monitor the zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and former Yugoslavia and report any violations. In addition, they were required to monitor any developments in the border areas concerning any hostile movement and report accordingly. As a testimony to the belligerents' lack of cooperation, by 1 December 1994 the total number of violations was 3317.<sup>45</sup>



On 1 July 1993 the Secretary General reported that observers would only be able to observe and report on Bosnia-Herzegovina's borders but would not be able to check the nature of the goods coming into and out of the republic.<sup>46</sup> The operations of UNMOS, normally conducted by small groups and at times only by two people, made it impossible to verify containers, which probably held materials in violation of the embargo. This was another snag in the process. The task of opening containers and verifying goods carried required a lot of manpower, which UNMOS could not provide.

UNMOS in UNPROFOR were in a situation different from UNTSO. They were treated poorly and were humiliated in the course of performing their duties. This exhibited the uncooperative attitude of the belligerents, which was another hindrance. Unlike UNTSO, where the mission was purely an observer one, UNMOS with UNPROFOR were working within a larger peace enforcement mission, where the entire mission was beleaguered with hostilities and accusations of lack of impartiality. This also impacted negatively on the UNMOS.

### Conclusion

To be able to conclude whether UNMOS were effective or not, it is important to look at the environment in this mission. This was an internal, ethnic conflict. Some incidents that occurred during the mission cast doubt on the UNMOS' viability. On 16 March 1993, three aircraft dropped bombs on two villages in the eastern part of Srebrenica. The UNMOS who were the eyes of UNPROFOR could not tell to whom the aircraft belonged.<sup>47</sup> This was as a result of the complicated environment whereby it was not conducive to properly monitor the ceasefire.

Because UNMOS were operating within a peace enforcement mission it was not easy to avoid accusations of bias, which in many cases were directed at the entire mission. The security of UNMOS was also jeopardized since it was to be provided by UNPROFOR, whose peacekeepers were unable to operate properly because of the unwillingness by the belligerents to cooperate with the mission, and also due to inadequate number of troops. A good example was the Srebrenica “safe area” which was being protected by about 200 members of a Dutch battalion. The Dutch soldiers were inadequate in number and armament and had no clear instructions on how to carry out the pledge of safety to Muslim refugees.<sup>48</sup> Eventually, 7000 Muslims were massacred. Cooperation was lacking, and UNMOS did not have access to some areas.

Nevertheless, valuable information came up as a result of UNMOS presence. On 2 June 1995, well before the final offensive on Srebrenica began, UNMOS wrote a confidential report on the presence in the region of Srebrenica (in Bratunac) of the militia led by Zeljko, known as “Arkan,” responsible for many of the worst massacres in Bosnia since 1992, stating that these militiamen were evil enough to “cleanse an enclave” and emphasizing the probability of an offensive in the near future. On 8 July 1995, when President Alija Izetbegovic was appealing to President Clinton, Mr. John Major (PM UK), President Chirac of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany to prevent the “genocide of the civilian population.” the UNMOS were writing that “a way must be found to prevent a general massacre.” Their report was transmitted to UNPROFOR’s headquarters in Zagreb. Within their capacity, reporting the situation on the ground was properly done.

On 10 July they repeated their warning: “If this continues a massacre is possible.”<sup>49</sup> They continuously made daily reports to their HQ in Zagreb on the progress of the Serbian attack on the safe area. What happened later is history. This was a situation whereby UNMOS, with their limitations, were helpless and could not deter any offensive. In this particular situation, the presence of UNMOS only served to highlight on the problem, which is what they were expected to do. This means that they were effective as long as they were operating within their expectations.

Understandably, this was a mission that was so complicated that the rapid changes in the situation at times made it difficult for any meaningful decision to be made. In the initial stages of the crisis, UNMOS were required for “reconnaissance” as the mission was being expanded--a job they did well. Fluctuations in the situation saw a number of issues come up. At times the situation required more than observation. The case of Srebrenica was one where even the presence of peacekeeping forces was not enough to stop the massacre. In any case the soldiers were to “deter by presence,”<sup>50</sup> which meant that they too were not in a position to stop the massacre. On the other hand UNPROFOR Headquarters was unable to act on the UNMOS report on the issue, which might have altered the course of events.

But Gerard Guthro in his thesis *Peacekeeping Where There is no Peace to Keep* argues that the fault laid with the Security Council and UN member-states since they failed to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary resources to carry out their duties. A good example was when Serbs began to overrun the safe haven of Gorazde in March 1994. UNPROFOR had only eight UNMOS in the area who could do little more than watch the Serbian offensive. How could the Security Council expect UNPROFOR to use

the presence of eight UNMOS to deter attacks on a town with a population of 65,000 people? <sup>51</sup>

UNPROFOR showed that in preparation for deploying peacekeeping troops it is practical to employ UNMOS to monitor and advise accordingly. When the UN presence is urgently required, UNMOS can be utilized while awaiting other forces. But then they could not counter any violations because they did not have the ability to do so. Because the entire mission was accused of bias, even the UNMOS lacked the moral persuasion to pacify the situation. In some cases even inspections required some enforcement measures, which they could not apply.

### Case Study Three: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

#### Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the largest country in Africa. Located at the center of the Continent and with a population of over 50 million, the country has immense economic resources in the form of mining, mineral processing and export of diamonds, copper, cobalt and crude oil. Ironically, the natural resources have brought the country chaos that has impoverished the population. Poverty and diseases can be attributed to mismanagement of the vast mineral wealth as well as geopolitics. Mobutu Sese Seko who took power in 1965 turned the country, which he had renamed Zaire, into a springboard for operations against Soviet backed Angola and thereby ensured US backing. After the cold war, Zaire ceased to be of interest to the US. In 1997 neighboring Rwanda invaded it to flush out extremist Hutu militias. It gave a boost to anti-Mobutu rebels who quickly captured the capital, Kinshasa, installed Laurent Kabila as president and renamed the country DRC. Soon a rift broke out between Kabila and his allies. A

new rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda threw Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe to Kabila's side, and the country was turned into a vast battleground. Soon Kabila was assassinated and his son Joseph took over as new head of state.

On 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, the DRC along with Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe signed a Ceasefire Agreement for a cessation of hostilities between all the belligerent forces in DRC. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, one of the two rebel movements signed the Agreement on 1 August the same year.<sup>52</sup>

On 6 August, the Security Council welcomed the agreement and urged the second rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) to sign as well. MONUC was subsequently established on 30 November 1999. According to Security Council resolution 1291 (2000) of 24 February 2000, the Mandate for MONUC was "to monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire, supervise and verify the disengagement and the redeployment of the parties' forces. Within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the provision of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition, weaponry and other war related material to the field, including all armed groups."<sup>53</sup>

#### Monitoring the Cease-Fire

In the spring of 2000, the UN reached an agreement with the Kabila regime for the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The Security Council authorized the introduction of 500 UNMOS with 5000 UN troops to protect them.<sup>54</sup> Their task would be to monitor, not enforce, the peace agreement and check for human rights abuses. However, they were not to be deployed until there were "firm and credible assurances" of security and

cooperation.<sup>55</sup> Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, the Security Council also decided that MONUC could take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect UN and co located Joint Military Commission personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. MONUC's operations were carried out in phases since its inception. Phase I was to achieve a ceasefire among the parties, phase II was disengagement of the forces along a confrontation line and phase III, deployment in the Eastern DRC.<sup>56</sup>

UNMOS' tasks, which would be in accordance with the peacekeeping functions listed in the agreement, included the following:

- (a) To establish contacts with the various parties at their headquarters locations, including in the capitals of the belligerent states;
- (b) To establish liaison with the JMC and collaborate with it in the implementation of the agreement;
- (c) To assist the Commission and the parties in investigating alleged violations on the ceasefire;
- (d) To make a general security assessment of the country;
- (e) To secure from the parties, guarantees of cooperation and assurances of security for the further deployment of in country of military observers;
- (f) To determine the present and likely future locations of the forces of all parties with a view to developing the concept for deployment of UN military personnel;
- (g) To observe, subject to the provision by the parties of adequate security, the ceasefire and disengagement of the forces and their redeployment and eventual withdrawal;
- (h) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to and protecting displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons;
- (i) To assist the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in further refining its concept of operations for subsequent deployments.<sup>57</sup>

The nature of the crisis required, due to the vastness of the country, a large number of peacekeeping troops. The potential for delayed implementation of the ceasefire by the various groups meant that for faster restoration of normalcy, some enforcement would sooner or later be required to coerce the belligerents to implement the

ceasefire. But even then, the mission, just like the other two, was obliged to practice impartiality. The belligerents were expected to fully cooperate with the UNMOS according to the provisions of the ceasefire, and no hindrance was expected from any quarters. Security of the UNMOS was the responsibility of both the peacekeepers and the belligerents.

Like UNTSO and UNPROFOR there were accusations of bias in the area. These had bad consequences for the UNMOS. Ironically, they did not come from the leadership of the main belligerents but mainly from ethnic groups' militias, which were not involved in the ceasefire in the first place. On 19 May 2003, fighting in Bunia in the Ituri District between rival militiamen from two local ethnic groups (Hema and Lendu) had reached a dangerous and unprecedented level. In the heat of chaos in the region, civilians were dying in large numbers. The UNMOS in the region were caught in the chaos. Two of them, a Jordanian and a Malawian, were brutally murdered in the middle of the situation. When the bodies of Major Safwat Oran and Captain Siddon Davis Banda were recovered, their corpses were covered in cigarette burns, were shot in the head and had their sexual organs cut off.<sup>58</sup> The Lendu fighters had accused the UNMOS of collaborating with the Hema, carrying them off, and executing them.

Even as the mission commenced operations, the security of UNMOS was a concern for the UN. As with many other missions, the vulnerability of UNMOS as a result of their status was always manifested. In December 2002 four members of MONUC, three Uruguayans and one Romanian, were ambushed and assaulted by a group of 30 unidentified armed people 15 kilometers south of Kanyabayonga, in North Kivu. The assailants who were armed with AK-47 assault rifles and machetes stripped the four

UNMOS of their communication equipment and property and wounded one of them with a machete. At the time, the area was plagued with insecurity, and it was unrealistic for the UNMOS to operate without any security. As a result, the best that MONUC could do was to “remind the de facto authorities in eastern DRC that they are responsible for the security of MONUC staff.”<sup>59</sup> It added that the parties to the Lusaka peace agreement had requested its presence on DRC territory, and that MONUC could not therefore be considered to be party to the conflict.

In an interview with the outgoing MONUC head Amos Namanga Ngongi on 3 July 2003 issues concerning the predicaments of the UNMOS came up. When asked to comment on incidents that affected UNMOS during his tenure, he replied that “those in charge of administration of various territories are obligated to protect the military observers. They are not armed. They are there to observe and write reports to help me in dealing with the belligerents in an effort to calm tensions. It is not the observers themselves who can calm things in the field. They do not have the means to do this. Therefore the administrators of the various territories must fully cooperate, and the UN Security Council has repeated this numerous times in resolutions calling on all parties to cooperate fully with the civil and military members of MONUC, especially with respect to facilitating the work of military observers.”<sup>60</sup>

The Security Council authorized the deployment of an emergency force in the eastern part in a quest to deter further human suffering because of the fighting. Incidents negatively impacting on the UNMOS did not end. In June 2003 a Tunisian and Russian observers were abducted at Kamango by unknown assailants. Pleas reverberated in and outside MONUC, even from the Secretary General to have them released. Even though



they were eventually released, unharmed for that matter, it was a reflection of the defenseless nature of UNMOS' duties.

On 12 February 2004, a Kenyan military observer, Major Peter Wachai was shot dead when armed men opened fire on the UN vehicle he was using with his colleagues. The attackers only fled when a UN helicopter opened fire on them. The incident, happening five years after the mission was set up showed the dangers that UNMOS are exposed to when uncontrolled groups outside the scope of negotiation are within the region.

As mentioned above, cooperation from the belligerents was a prerequisite to the success of the mission, but apparently this was not forthcoming. By May 2002, it was noted that of all the original belligerents, only Namibia had withdrawn all its combat forces from the territory. The peace process was slow, and recommendations to advance the process further were deemed necessary.

The withdrawals of contingents by Angola, Zimbabwe and Uganda were partial and needed to be finally verified. At this time UNMOS had been able to monitor and verify the ceasefire and disengagements because the belligerents were regular foreign armies, which could be easily monitored. An interim border security measure that was to facilitate the continued withdrawal of the neighboring armies was proposed. This was to be coordinated between the foreign forces, and deployment of Congolese troops accompanied by MONUC observers.<sup>61</sup> This was good as long as it only involved the regular forces. The DRC, with its size, also has other tribal militias, which complicated the equation. This meant that MONUC had not only to deal with the belligerent foreign armies but also the tribal militias.

By June 2003, the major impediment to realization of total peace in the DRC was still the fighting in the eastern part of the country, the areas of North and South Kivu and Bunia. This fighting was not only inconsistent with the quest for a political solution, it also posed the risk that political agreements might be undermined and their credibility called into question. Since the UNMOS could not handle this situation, an Interim Emergency Multinational Force was formed, to ensure security where it was deployed, to control access to the towns and to prevent movements of armed personnel in and outside town.<sup>62</sup> Some interlocutors recommended a mandate under Chapter VII with sufficient strength to carry it out.<sup>63</sup>

MONUC is still operating in the DRC. Of course it is difficult to foretell what will eventually happen, bearing in mind the alliances that keep shifting and at times unpredictable violence which naturally have their consequences. For the UNMOS it is their best effort and impartiality that in most cases appeals to the belligerents. The challenges that MONUC is facing are monstrous. Other than the Government of Mr. Joseph Kabila and the two major belligerent groups, several other groups exist with their own interests and agendas. Some of the problems that the UNMOS have encountered in the course of performing their duties include dealing with some minor ethnic groups which were not major stake holders in the peace process but who pose serious threats to MONUC's effort.

### Conclusion

Revisiting the specific instructions to the UNMOS, one can easily say that contacts with various parties, liaison, observing the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and redeployment have been achieved. This means that UNMOS have managed to

operate well within their parameters. While these can be noted as some of the gains since inception of the mission, a much remains to be done, especially concerning security--not only the security for the UNMOS but the entire country. The Statement by the President of the Security Council late 2003 vividly paints a gloomy picture of the situation. The Security Council:

Condemned the continuing illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, especially in the eastern part of the country and recalled that it has always categorically condemned these activities, which are the main elements perpetuating the conflict, and reaffirms the importance of stopping them by exerting, if need be, the necessary pressure on the armed groups, and all other actors involved.<sup>64</sup>

The UNMOS who were killed were accused of bias and hence paid with their lives. Of course it is difficult to say exactly what happened, but the point is that the perception of bias has its consequences.

So far, “Africa’s worst war” is proving to be too difficult to pacify because the situation requires enforcement to facilitate total peace. Not only is it difficult for the UNMOS to properly conduct their activities, the future of the entire country looks bleak. The conflict seems to have been forgotten, and based on recent developments, it is clear that peace still remains elusive.

Even though there have been some achievements, it has not been easy for the UNMOS to operate as required. The provision of security, which is supposed to be taken care of by the belligerent leaders, has not been adequately addressed, resulting in the loss of UNMOS lives. A Government of National Unity and Transition was formed after the peace accords were signed, but this has not alleviated sufferings of the Congolese.

The situation in DRC differs from many areas with UN participation. The Government is not in full control of the eastern part of the country where these killings

have occurred and is not in a position to provide any security. No wonder the loss of lives has only been occurring in the rebel areas. The country itself is so large that responding to distress by the peacekeepers is difficult.

The Security Council has “expressed its intentions to continue following closely this situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”<sup>65</sup> This means that the Security Council intends to have UNMOS closely observe and report on the situation. However, it is unlikely that without enforcement measures, nothing much will change because of vastness of the country and unwillingness of the belligerents

UNMOS are expected to seek assistance from the Force Headquarters which controls the air resources, and that normally takes time. As a result of all this UNMOS always operate under uncertainty and stress because it is hard to predict what the situation might be even the next day. This is compounded by the fact that there is no form of deterrence against possible antagonists.

There is no doubt that the decision to employ UNMOS in consideration of the situation was a wise one. However, the situation as it is, is unlikely to change because UNMOS do not have the capacity to enforce any compliance. The UN forces in DRC are inadequate, hence the continued fighting in the country. The exploitation of natural resources that continue to fund the conflict continues and unless the UN acts and increase peacekeepers for enforcement, the UNMOS may as well remain there in eternity.

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<sup>1</sup>Gerard A. Gouthro, “Peacekeeping When There is no Peace to Keep” A Case Study for UNPROFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina. (Thesis, Department of Political Science, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1995), 4-5.

<sup>2</sup>Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas George Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers: Soldiers with a Difference* (New York: Foreign Policy Association and the Ford Foundation, 1990), 12.

<sup>3</sup>John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, 1st ed. (Boston, MA: Benchmark Production, 1998), 18.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Hillen, 18-22.

<sup>6</sup>Larry M. Forster, "Training Standards for United Nations Military Observers: The Foundation of Excellence," *African Security Review* 6, no. 4 (1997): 1.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: UN Publication, 1985), 14.

<sup>9</sup>Peace and Security Section, DPKO, *UNTSO Mandate* [document on-line]; available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/untso/mandate.html>; Internet; accessed 26 March 2004.

<sup>10</sup>United Nations, Resolution 50 (1948), 29 May 1948, 20.

<sup>11</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 17.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Hillen, 57.

<sup>15</sup>United Nations, *Instructions to United Nations Observers Engaged in the Supervision of Truce in Palestine*, (UN Doc. S/928 of July 1948), 338, (hereafter cited as UN Doc. S/928).

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 17.

<sup>18</sup>Palestine Facts, "Who Killed Count Folke Bernadotte?" *Israel's Independence*, 2004, 1.

<sup>19</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 34-35.

<sup>20</sup>UN Doc. S/928, 338.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 35-36.

<sup>22</sup>UN Doc. S/928, 338.

<sup>23</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 27.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>25</sup>Saul Singer, "Why Israel Rejects Observers," *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Viewpoints*, no 459 (1 August 2001): 1.

<sup>26</sup>UN Doc. S/928 of July 1948, 338.

<sup>27</sup>United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, 25.

<sup>28</sup>James Mayall, *The New Interventionism: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 63.

<sup>29</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>31</sup>Mayall, 63.

<sup>32</sup>Gouthro, 35.

<sup>33</sup>Mayall, 63.

<sup>34</sup>Gouthro, 36.

<sup>35</sup>*Ibid.*, 38.

<sup>36</sup>UN Department of Public Information, *Former Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR*, Bosnia and Herzegovina, September 1996 [document on-line]; available at [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unprof\\_b.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm); Internet; accessed 5 March 2004.

<sup>37</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup>Gouthro, 40.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>Department of Public Information, *Former Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR*.

<sup>41</sup>Gouthro, 45.

<sup>42</sup>United Nations. Resolution 958 (199).

<sup>43</sup>AF SOUTH FACT SHEETS, 18 July 2003,1.

<sup>44</sup>Government Accounting Office, *Briefing report*, 05/08/95, GAO/NSAID-95-148 BR.

<sup>45</sup>UN Department of Public Information, *Former Yugoslavia-UNPROFOR*.

<sup>46</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup>CBSNEWS.com, *Sharing the Blame*, THE HAGUE, Netherlands, 10 April 2002; available from <http://www.cbsnews/stories/2002/04/10/world/main505796.shtml>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2004.

<sup>49</sup>Bosnian Institute, *AICG Call to Indict General Janvier*, Bosnia, November-December 1997, 3, available from <http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/novdec97/indict.cfm>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2004.

<sup>50</sup>CBSNEWS.com, *Sharing the Blame*, The HAGUE, Netherlands, April 10 2002 Available from <http://www.cbsnews/stories/2002/04/10/world/main505796.shtml>; Internet; accessed 25 March 2004.

<sup>51</sup>Gouthro, 89.

<sup>52</sup>Monuc Home, "Background," available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/background.html>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2004.

<sup>53</sup>DPKIO, available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2004.

<sup>54</sup>Monuc Home "Background," Available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/background.html>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2004.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup>Security Council mission to Central Africa report S/2002/537, 3.

<sup>57</sup>Report of the secretary General on the UN preliminary deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/1999/790), 15 July 1999, 1.

<sup>58</sup>Declan Walsh, "How two UN men died in Congo" *La Democratie Chretienne*, 2 June 2003, 1; Available from <http://www.geocities.com/bureaupolitiquefsd/silence>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2004.

<sup>59</sup>Iafrica.com, "UN Observers Attacked in DRC." *World News* (10 December 2002). Available at <http://iafrica.com/news/worldnews/194682.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2004.

<sup>60</sup>IRIN news. “Interview with outgoing MONUC head Amos Namanga Ngongi”, Kinshasa, 3 July 2003, 1. Available from <http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=35159>; Internet; accessed 29 January 2003.

<sup>61</sup>Security Council mission to Central Africa report S/2002/537, 27 April-7 May 2002, 1-7.

<sup>62</sup>Security Council Mission to Central Africa, report S/2003/653, 7-16 June 2003, 4.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2003/21, 1-2.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Conclusions

Conflict scenarios in three different regions of the world were examined in this study to determine how UNMOS fared in each case, with the obvious limitation of not being able to defend themselves and not enforcing any resolve. The three conflicts differed from each other in many ways because of their causes and the approach that the UN took in trying to resolve them.

So, how effective have UNMOS been in support of peace operations? The case studies showed that UNMOS were effective when they operated within their parameters. They managed to report and provide valuable information in each of the case studies. In fact, when situations occurred which resulted to removing UNMOS out of operations, valuable information that could have contributed immensely to the peace efforts was not forthcoming.

Conditions that existed when the UN was initiating its first mission have also changed. When the first mission was established, the world was polarized between two major ideological blocks. This had an effect on observer operations, as some of the decisions made by then were hinged on superpower interests. The UN is no longer inhibited by decisions that are likely to create animosity and threaten world peace and security. Also in those early years, conflicts of ethnic nature requiring UN intervention were not common, which made UNMO operations easily applicable. UN peace operations were mainly interstate. Today however, there are more intra-state conflicts, which require resolution in a different manner.

The case studies also showed that although different situations require different approaches to solving conflicts, common problems exist that affect all UNMOS. This is so regardless of the time, location and environment of the mission. The case studies reinforce a major constraint in the employment of UNMOS, which is their inability to coerce any compliance to resolution, whether or not they are operating within Chapter VI or within a peace enforcement force under Chapter VII. Accusations of lack of impartiality are almost always guaranteed. But these normally have political undertones.

One similarity that stood out from the three studies is that the presence or employment of UNMOS did not substantially enhance the peace process at all. The peace achieved, if any, was a result of belligerent willingness and a little coercion by use of force. The UNMOS have been a small part of the process, which means that total peace is only possible when the belligerents are ready, and at times use of force is necessary to obtain the desired results.

The first case study concerned fighting for land, and Israel tended to accuse the UN of bias because of its survival. As to whether there were any justifications for the accusations or not is a different matter. In the second case study, fighting for ethnic hegemony made the belligerents continually accuse the UNMOS of bias simply to gain political mileage. And in case study three, accusations of bias came from uncontrolled militias who were fighting for control of the natural resources in parts of the country. Somehow, no accusations of bias were reported by the signatories to the truce.

The security of UNMOS was jeopardized in most instances. In the Middle East, it only happened when there was a collapse of authority within the region but the governments protected the UNMOS as best as they could, including removing them from

their areas of operations when they felt they were endangered. In the Former Yugoslavia the belligerents did not seem interested in the security of UNMOS and in fact at times used them as bargaining chips whenever they felt disadvantaged. In some instances, UNMOS had to call in air support for deterrence. In the DRC UNMOS were killed because they were not protected and lacked the capability to deter any attack on themselves.

Cooperation was lacking at times in the first case study and was completely lacking in the second. In case study three, the belligerents seemed to be impeding the implementation of the ceasefire. Cooperation was lacking from the uncontrolled tribal militias, though that was not a recognized requirement from them, as they were not part of the peace process. These clearly demonstrate how cooperation or lack of it can affect the peace process, because in the three case studies, total peace still remains elusive.

As the case studies have shown, in some situations it is possible to employ UNMOS if established governments exist with the machinery and resources to provide them with the necessary protection, that is, governments that respect the UN, what it stands for, and are devoted to the peace process. The first observer mission was a testing platform for subsequent operations. Because the UNMOS could not prevent the outbreak of hostilities, what was expected of them was pure observation and reporting. Only when the belligerents hindered their efforts as a result of either deliberate refusal or when their security was at stake were they not able to “perform”. And in active situations, when UNMOS were removed from the operational area, valuable information was lost because nobody could substitute for them.

Different situations require different approaches. It is possible to employ UNMOS without arms in some situations, and they can be very effective, but in other situations it is not possible at all. In circumstances where the UNMOS were armed, it was to protect them against wild animals, but no action was taken to protect them against “wild” belligerents. In most UN Missions, there are usually evacuation plans. In Angola, when the UN (UNAVEM) was active, all the UNMO team sites were located near airstrips that could be easily used to evacuate the observers if the need arose. But it was never clear as to what would happen if the weather did not permit the landing of aircraft.

In the former Yugoslavia, it was not practical to employ UNMOS because of the prevailing situation at the time. The UNMOS were in a violent ethnic war in which the UN did not provide sufficient forces to force compliance when required. In most cases UNMOS found themselves in situations whereby the belligerents were openly going against the agreed ceasefire agreements. Much of the “ethnic cleansing” happened under the very eyes of the UNMOS, because they did not have the capability to interfere or even protect themselves. But they reported much of what they saw; in fact, in most cases the information they provided was valuable. However, under such circumstances, what they reported could not be acted upon immediately. Their own security was always in jeopardy, and they provided good bargaining chips for the belligerents when situations were bad and they were taken hostage.

In the DRC, the situation was slightly different. The situation was of foreign armies that were required to pull out according to the ceasefire agreement. Other players (tribal militias) came into the picture as the mission had been set up and only complicated the situation. UNMOS had been able to monitor and report on the ceasefire status. The

security situation, however, was a different matter. In sorting out the problems in the eastern part of the country, the UN had to form a reaction force to quell the chaos because UNMOS could not perform their monitoring function.

Nevertheless, observer missions, if performed well, have been extremely important in the course of peace and represent a great “economy of force,” by making a large impact on the peace process for a small expenditure of resources. All the problems that the UNMOS faced have been caused by uncooperative belligerents.

An UNMO definitely represents nobility, humbleness, and most important of all, impartiality. In the event that any of these is missing, everything would be compromised. Technically, the military observer is required because of his expertise on matters of a military nature. He is supposed to be a master in the art of employment of military hardware, knowledgeable with equipment and shrewd enough to make right assessments, judgments, and timely decisions.

UNMOS are still a viable tool in any peacekeeping mission. Because UNMOS do not expend resources as much as formed forces do, they are desirable to use. The employment of UNMOS is essential to enable missions to obtain the necessary information required to facilitate correct decision making. This is so regardless of the stage in the peace process. Because of their structure and numbers, they cannot pose any military threat to the belligerents. The problems that they have previously faced can be addressed without necessarily having to do away with them. Observation needs to be done by groups of small numbers of people with the ability to move fast and adjust to conditions as necessary, and UNMOS can do that, as long as the other parties observe the neutrality of the UNMOS.

As of now, the UN is likely to face more intra-state and ethnic conflicts than the early years. This only means more security problems for the UNMOS, as they will be likely dealing with uncontrolled gangs that pose serious threats. Accusations of lack of impartiality are likely to continue and even cooperation will be harder to come by. This, therefore calls for a review and adjustment.

### Recommendations

Even though over the years UNMOS have been used almost entirely in the same mode of operations, this does not necessarily need to continue. True, in almost all cases UNMOS have been needed and have played important roles in all the missions. They acted as advance parties to lay ground for further UN peacekeeping operations, while in other instances they were part of a permanent watchdog to warn of any threat to escalating tensions. Looking at the world over the fifty years that UNMOS have been deployed in the arena of peace operations, one cannot fail to notice the successes that some observer missions have achieved. UNMOGIP, UNYOM, United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG), and United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) are but a few of the missions that have done well with UNMOS.

UNMOGIP was successful because, as in UNTSO the mission was interstate between India and Pakistan. ONUMOZ was intra state but was dealing with two major groups with ideological, not ethnic differences. In these missions there was minimal bias against the UN. As a result, security of the UNMOS was not a big issue and cooperation was fully provided by the belligerents.

However, some situations demand different approaches. The United Nations should be able to deploy, just as it did in Namibia, observers with arms according to the

situation. In cases where there is uncertainty over the situation, adequate security measures must be put into place before deploying UNMOS. This can either be done while incorporating UNMOS with peacekeeping forces or, if observers have to operate independently, they have to be armed.

The UN needs to continue employing UNMOS, because of the requirement of fast deployment and because UNMOS have always been easier to manage. However, in situations where the security situation is not favorable, they should be armed. But armed or not, the employment of UNMOS should be weighed against the use of peacekeeping or peace enforcement units. After all, peacekeeping forces are armed; and as the case studies have shown, whatever impacts on the UNMOS also impacts on the forces.

If a conflict is interstate, that is, between two or more countries, and where there are established governments that can guarantee security of the UNMOS, then the UN can still employ UNMOS without arms provided that the governments accept responsibility for the protection of the UNMOS. Even then, coordination between the UNMOS and peacekeeping forces must exist on how the latter can support the former, either in evacuation or provision of security even when monitoring or conducting investigations if they feel threatened.

If there is any apprehension or uncertainty, either from wild animals or gangs that are not party to the peace process, and there is potential danger to the UNMOS, then UNMOS should also be armed. This is particularly necessary where conflicts are intra-state, especially when the conflict is ethnic oriented, because ethnic groups are not signatories to membership in the UN.

Before a peacekeeping mission is established, depending on the situation, UNMOS should be given arms because of the uncertainty as the UNMOS conduct observation for either possible deployment of forces or as part of the initial stage in establishing liaison and making a security assessment of the situation. This has to be done with utmost care, not to inflame a volatile situation, but should be seen as a critical part of the preparation.

There is no rule against the use of arms by observers; the employment of UNMOS without arms has only been practiced because, at the onset of UN peacekeeping operations, the conditions were suitable for having UNMOS without arms, and the conflicts to which the UN attended were basically between states. Over the years the world has witnessed conflicts that are complicated and require a rethinking of this mode of operation. In the contemporary operating environment, chaos and anarchy is the order of the day, especially because of ethnic divisions. Today, conflicts confronting the world require a different approach. Should the UN not adjust?



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